Study on Śrīmadbhagavadgītātparya, exposition of Bhagavadgītā, Hindu philosophical text, by D.V. Gundappa.

Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves? On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. (...) Hypocrisy undermines this process of mutual deliberation. Thus, even if better than silence, hypocritical blaming is second-best, and that is why it is wrong. (shrink)

In this paper, we undertake a comparative study of the stress–strain response and slip activity of α- and γ-polymorph of hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX) under pressure loading using a rate-dependent single-crystal plasticity model. Texture evolution studies are performed to further understand the effects of the dominant slip systems. The simulations indicate that the difference in elastic moduli and lattice parameters for α- and γ-RDX lead to different elastic–plastic constitutive response in the two polymorphs. γ-RDX exhibits more plastic slip compared to α-RDX for (...) loading on (1 1 1) plane and the two polymorphs have different sets of dominant slip systems. We observe that the high-pressure slip system (0 0 1)[0 1 0] that is determined using molecular dynamics simulations is the most dominant slip system for this orientation. Whereas, for loading on (2 1 0) plane, α-RDX has marginally higher plastic slip than γ-RDX, though the same slip system is dominant for both the polymorphs. The texture evolution for loading on (1 1 1) and (2 1 0) planes follow the path towards the most dominant slip systems for both the polymorphs. We predict that the larger plastic slip in γ-RDX for loading on (1 1 1) plane might play an important role in understanding the reduced sensitivity for shock loading on (1 1 1) plane, when compared to (2 1 0) for which γ-RDX has lesser plastic slip, and (1 0 0) which is purely elastic. (shrink)

Hypocrisy seems to be a distinctive moral wrong. This thesis offers an account of that wrong. The distinctive wrong of hypocrisy is not a rational failing, or a deception of others. It is a problem in how we critique, and blame, others, when we ourselves are guilty of similar faults. Not only does it seem wrong to blame others hypocritically; it is also widely remarked that hypocrites ‘lack standing’ to blame. I defend both judgments. When we engage others in response (...) to wrongdoing, there is both instrumental and non-instrumental value in ensuring that those who face similar moral predicaments reason about these predicaments, and the appropriate responses to them, together. Hypocrisy is wrong because it hampers our ability to realise that value. And hypocrites lose standing to blame for a similar reason. Standing depends on the value of particular people engaging in an accountability procedure together, a value which the hypocrite forestalls, by failing to acknowledge wrongdoing in the course of blaming. This account of a duty to blame non-hypocritically helps unpack the relationship between hypocrisy and a range of other defects in a person’s standing. It also responds to a central sceptical challenge to the wrongness of hypocritical blaming. The challenge is that accurate hypocritical blaming can’t be wrong because it is morally good, and indeed is morally better than not blaming others at all. My response: hypocritical blaming is wrong, not because it is morally worse than not blaming at all, but because it is second-best, i.e. worse than non-hypocritical blaming, which enables mutual deliberation about wrongdoing. (shrink)

This introduction to the Madhva school of Vedanta is accessible to a wide audience with interest in Hinduism, Indian thought and in the comparative philosophy of religion.Deepak Sarma explores the philosophical foundations of Madhva Vedanta and then presents translations of actual debates between the Madhva and Advaita schools of Vedanta, thus positioning readers at the centre of the 700 year-old controversy between these two schools of Vedanta. Original texts of Madhvacarya are included in an appendix, in translation and in (...) Sanskrit. (shrink)

Deepak Sarma completes the first outline in more than fifty years of India's key philosophical traditions, inventively sourcing seminal texts and clarifying language, positions, and issues. Organized by tradition, the volume covers six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy: Mimamsa (the study of the earlier Vedas, later incorporated into Vedanta), Vedanta (the study of the later Vedas, including the _Bhagavad Gita_ and the _Upanishads_), Sankhya (a form of self-nature dualism), Yoga (a practical outgrowth of Sankhya), and Nyaya and Vaisesika (two (...) forms of realism). It also discusses Jain philosophy and the Mahayana Buddhist schools of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Sarma maps theories of knowledge, perception, ontology, religion, and salvation, and he details central concepts, such as the _pramanas_ (means of knowledge), _pratyaksa_ (perception), _drayvas_ (types of being), _moksa_ (liberation), and _nirvana_. Selections and accompanying materials inspire a reassessment of long-held presuppositions and modes of thought, and accessible translations prove the modern relevance of these enduring works. (shrink)

Do you have to be one to know one? Madhvàcàrya, the founder of the thirteenth century school of Vedànta, answered this question with a resounding 'yes!' Madhvàcàrya's insistence that one must be a Màdhva to study Màdhva Vedànta led him to employ various strategies to exclude outsiders and unauthorized readers from accessing the root texts of his tradition and from obtaining oral commentary from living virtuosos. Deepak Sarma explores the degree to which outsiders can understand and interpret the doctrine (...) of the Màdhva school of Vedànta. The school is based on insider epistemology which is so restrictive that few can learn its intricate doctrines. This book reveals the complexity of studying traditions based on insider epistemologies and encourages its audience to ponder both the value and the hazards of granting any outsider the authority and opportunity to derive important insights into a tradition as an insider. The first analysis of the Màdhva tradition, this work contributes to the ongoing controversies regarding epistemic authority and voice in religious studies. (shrink)

The quest for knowledge, for Socrates, is a holistic approach in which the subject is required to transform himself. This brings Socrates’ philosophy closer to the self-enhancement practice of spiritualism. The present study tries to explore the spiritual hue in the key thoughts of Socrates, viz., self-knowledge, goodness, knowledge and virtue, conscious ignorance, training for death, and the investigative methods he used like irony, midwifery method, and dialectic method, etc. The work is an analytical study based on the relevant published (...) works and the dialogues of Plato in which the character Socrates represents the philosophy of the historical Socrates. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this essay, I shall discuss Gadamer’s interpretation of Celan’s dialogical poetry in his essay “Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?” (“Who am I and Who are You?”). One may argue that this is Gadamer’s articulation of the problem of the self-other relationship. To understand the question of self and other, it is first of all necessary to return to the poetic word from which the question arises. Speaking is, for Gadamer, the most profoundly self-forgetful action, because when (...) one speaks, one is so deeply “within the word” that one is not turned toward the word but, rather, to what one wants to say with the word. For hermeneutics, interpreting means putting oneself on the task of the poetic text. The proximity between poetizing and interpreting emerges, also in its specificity concerning the proximity between poetizing and thinking. Such a proximity, in turn, divides itself into two extremes: the word that sublates itself, and the word that stands for itself. It is hence the uncertain fullness of language, where, unsurprisingly, both poetizing and interpreting come into themselves, which constitutes the link between the one and the other. Therefore, the interpreted word, intertwined with the poetic word does not replace what it indicates, but merely points beyond itself, to what is other than itself. Both pursue a meaning that points toward an open realm. (shrink)

Study on the contribution of Citsukha, 13th century Indian philosopher, to the non-dualistic (advaita) school of Hindu philosophy.

The paper is an attempt to revisit Rawls’ idea of a self, which elicits the concept of justice in the liberal tradition. Justice, as understood in the social and political context, is the basic feature of a well-ordered and rationally developed society and it is considered to be a virtue of the social institution. The liberal theory believes in the basic principle that right is prior to the good, and what is most fundamental to our personhood are not the ends (...) we choose but our capacity to choose them. Hence, in Rawls’ account of the self, absoluteness of the metaphysical priority has an edge over the absoluteness of the moral priority. The idea of an unencumbered self, in the social and historical sense, is at the core of the Kantian-Rawlsian theory of justice, which is under attack by the communitarians. Communitarians like Sandel, however, questions Rawls’ claim for the priority of right over good and maintains that liberals fail to recognize the self is ‘embedded,’ in and partly constituted by communal commitments and values which are objects of choice. In this paper, I examine communitarian critiques of Rawls’ liberal self. Further, I also refer to Rawls’ turn to the ‘political,’ which works as a ‘module’ that fits into and can be supported by a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Robert Zydenbos' Review of An Introduction to Mādhva VedāntaDeepak SarmaIntroductionI am grateful to the editors of Philosophy East and West for asking me to write a response to Zydenbos' review of my book, An Introduction to Mādhva Vedānta. To this end, I will address four issues: typographical errors, unfounded claims about my translations, content and problems of method and theory, and the future of scholarship in Mādhva (...) Vedānta.Typographical DoṣasFirst, I wish to thank Zydenbos for pointing out the typographical errors. I take full responsibility for them and I intend to correct them in future editions. These are unintentional mistakes and should not be taken as an accurate indicator of my academic ability. I invite readers to examine my other publications on Mādhva Vedānta and to decide for themselves. Jayatīrtha (1365-1388 C.E.), a renowned Mādhva commentator, explained the reasons for such errors in his Pramāṇapad-dhati. He held that defective eyes, whether from cataract, jaundice, or the like,1 [End Page 670] can give rise to defective knowledge, and further, that if an object is too far away, too near, too small, obstructed, or even mixed with similar things, then this will give rise to incorrect knowledge.2 I knew that such errors were likely to occur (especially given the size of the fonts in the page proofs!), which is why I wrote the following in my acknowledgments: "Errors that remain in this text are entirely my own responsibility. If any are found I beg your forgiveness and hope that they inspire you to further study Mādhva Vedānta!" (p. xi). Perhaps all of the undue attention paid by Zydenbos to typographical errors (he devoted a significant portion of his review to them) will inspire further study!TranslationsI am delighted that Zydenbos found my translations to be "not badly done" and disappointed that he incorrectly "assumes" that they are not my own. Rest assured that they are mine. I was assisted by Professor Lawrence McCrea and scholars of the Pūrṇaprajña Saṃśodhana Mandiram (PPSM) and have dutifully acknowledged all of them in my book (p. xii). Zydenbos should know better than to speculate about matters he has no knowledge of.Content and Methodological IssuesThe typographical errors and accusations of plagiarism are far less interesting than the points that were raised about the content of my book. Disputes in the West about interpretations of Mādhva Vedānta are recent; it has been largely ignored in favor of Buddhism and the crypto-Buddhist school, namely Advaita Vedānta. There have been very few books on Mādhva Vedānta written by outsiders, and those few are no longer in print, are poorly written, use dated language, or are in a language that is not available to most lay Mādhvas. Interpretations of Mādhva doctrines made by their authors have remained unquestioned by Western readers given the relative novelty and obscurity of Mādhva Vedānta, while Mādhva insiders have ignored most of them. It is wonderful, then, that Zydenbos doubts my interpretations. After all, his disputes are among the first ones published by an outsider concerning the interpretation of Mādhva doctrines.3Zydenbos' skepticism is reason for celebration for it indicates that Western scholarship on Mādhva Vedānta has come of age. There are now enough scholars of Mādhva Vedānta (or, rather, scholars who claim knowledge of Mādhva Vedānta) in the West that such a debate can occur. I invite others to investigate the points of dispute and to join this expanding community!Zydenbos has also faulted me on the organizational principles of my introductory text. I have, as he correctly notes, intentionally ignored issues of contemporary politics, a topic that he finds essential. Although some historical and political issues are relevant, I find that philosophical discourse sans context is far more intellectually appealing. I am well aware of my biases and have acknowledged the limitations of my historical analysis: [End Page 671]... the history presented here is not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, it is intended... (shrink)

On economic ideas of Deendayal Upadhyaya, 1916-1968, politician and nationalist leader of India.

On Hindu ethics and code of conduct in Hindu smr̥tis.

Exposition of Daśaprakaraṇa (ten minor collective tracts) on Dvaita Vedanta by Madhva, 13th cent. ; includes complete text in Sanskrit.

In recent years, there has been growing interest in bridging bodies of knowledge from introspective and contemplative traditions with modern neuroscience. By making the primary object of study an individual’s subjective experience, scientists are then confronted with the challenging problem of how to record a given mental state at a given point in time. For simple experiences, such as in facial recognition tasks, an external recording device such as a button box or computer keyboard is adequate. However, these devices pose (...) fundamental problems when attempting to record more subtle states of mind, or to do so in situations where the presence of an external input device would disturb the subject, such as in the case of studying the evolution of internal states of highly advanced meditators. Here, I suggest that variants of the mnemonic techniques used in memory competitions can be used to make measurements in experiments where an external device would be impractical to use, or would unnecessarily disturb the subject. Demographic and performance data from memory competitions suggest that these techniques can be learned by ordinary subjects participating in multi-session experiments, and that, for highly trained individuals, events can be recorded at roughly 400 millisecond intervals for timescales on the order of tens of seconds, and at roughly one-second intervals for sustained periods of one hour or longer. Finally, I discuss the relationship of the current proposal to descriptive experience sampling (DES) and the visualization techniques of the Tibetan meditative tradition. (shrink)

Situational and experiential factors provide a moral lens through which people judge the morality or otherwise of actions. The research in this volume goes a step further and illustrates that individual differences may interact with these situational and experiential factors to explain the acquisition of positive attitudes to immoral behaviour.

Not much work has been done on Hindu bioethics other than by a select few scholars and medical doctors. Professor Cromwell Crawford, author of Dilemmas of Life and Death: Hindu Ethics in a North American Context and Hindu Ethics for the Twenty-first Century, for example, is well known in the field of Hindu bioethics. Others scholars include Dr. Uma Mysorekar, who is a gynecologist as well as the president of the board of trustees of the Ganesha Temple of Flushing New (...) York. She has published several short pieces on Hindu bioethics, and has even been interviewed by PBS for their “Religion and Ethics” program. Dr. H. L. Trivedi, director of the Institute of Kidney Diseases and Research Center at the Civil Hospital Campus in Ahmedabad, India, is also prominent. His pithy paragraph in Transplant Proceedings on Hinduism and organ transplantation is cited with enormous frequency on the Internet and elsewhere. These thinkers, however, are unequivocally wrong in their position that Hinduism supports organ transplantation, and, more importantly, that it offers any coherent or systematic bioethics whatsoever. (shrink)

On semantics according to the Vākyārthamātr̥kā of Śālikanāthamiśra, fl. 780-825.